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A.

Statement of the Case

This is an appeal from a decision issued following a Court trial that took place on
October 16 and 17, 2016. R000064-000086 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Directions for Entry of Judgment, hereinafter "Decision").
Appellant David Johnson ("Johnson") filed a Complaint in this case on August 10,
2015. In his Complaint, Johnson sought, in sum, (J) a declaration that he was a member
of Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC ("DTC"); (2) a declaration that he is an equal
interest member in DTC; (3) a finding that Respondent David Crossett ("Crossett")
breached a fiduciary duty to Johnson in his management, operation and eventual sale of
DTC; (4) a finding that Crossett made improper distributions to himself through DTC;
and ( 5) that Crossett improperly removed Johnson as a member of DTC. See ROOOO 10 R000018.
The First Amended Complaint was filed on April 8, 2016, and added Appellant Tessa
Cousins ("Cousins") as a plaintiff, added several defendants that were later dismissed and
are not party to this appeal, and also added allegations related to those dismissed
defendants. See R000025

R000040.

The District Court found that Johnson and Cousins were never Members of DTC.
The District Court went on to state that even if they had become Members of DTC,
Crossett had the authority to manage, and appropriately managed and sold DTC, did not
pay himself any improper distribution, and that as of December 2015, DTC was no longer
a going concern. See R000080
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Relevant Facts

B.

Johnson learned of a business opportunity from information he obtained about DOT
Compliance Service ("DOT"), a business owed and operated by Jeff Minert, Johnson's
brother-in-law. R000065. DOT is in a niche market of providing drug and alcohol testing
programs, and other compliance services, to employers and operators of qualifying
transport companies, for drivers that have been identified as being required to comply
with certain Department of Transportation licensing requirements and reporting
regulations. Id.
Johnson got Crossett interested in opening a similar business, and the "two then
investigated the specifics of getting the company up and operating during the early
months of2013." Id. By April of 2013, they had decided on their general plan that
Crossett and Johnson would be the members of the Company, that Crossett would run the
Company and receive a salary. R000066.
Johnson knew of Cousins, "who was an employee of the brother-in-law's
company, and after discussion with Crossett, they decided that Crossett would approach
Cousins with a proposal for her to join their new company." Id.
Cousins would receive a salary for her position and would become a 10% member
of the Company at some point in time. Id.
DTC was formed by David Crossett in June of 2013 as a single member entity,
with Crossett being the sole member upon filing papers with the Idaho Secretary of State.
R000067.
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A written operating agreement was prepared by Mr. Jacobson (counsel to
Johnson) and approved by both Crossett and Johnson at the end of July, 2013. That
agreement was never signed. Id.
A few days after DTC opened for business, it was sued by Johnson's brother-inlaw's company, DOT. R000067. "This litigation was eventually settled in the summer
of 2014. at a huge cost oflegal fees." R000067.
At all relevant time periods, Johnson wanted to keep his involvement with DTC a
secret, "he did not want to disclose to the family members involved that he was starting a
company in direct competition with those family members." Defendant's Exhibit J, p. 8,
LL 1-4.
Johnson went so far as to sign a statement for his brother-in-laws' attorneys that,
although he had supplied information about the in-laws' business to Crossett, he did not
have any interest in the entity that Crossett had formed." Id., citing Defendant's Exhibit
J.

Johnson told Crossett that he did not want to sign the operating agreement "until
the dust settled." R000068.
Crossett continued to ask Johnson to sign the operating agreement and he refused.

Id.
Cousins was not party to any of the discussions between Johnson and Crossett
about the formation of DTC. Id.

Cousins also refused to sign the written operating

agreement when requested, and eventually resigned as an employee of DTC. Id.
From the outset, DTC had severe financial and legal problems. R000069.
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In the early Fall of 2014, Crossett again asked Johnson to sign the operating
agreement and "Johnson indicated that he considered all of the legal problems and
management issues to be Crossett's problems to solve, and he was not willing to sign the
operating agreement until the problems were resolved." R000069.
During the late Fall of 2014 Crossett informed Johnson that he vvould continue
with DTC as a single member company and do what he could to salvage the company.
R000070. Johnson then asked for the money back that he had paid towards start up costs,
approximately $10,000, and those monies were paid by DTC to Johnson by December of
2014. Id.
With an individual named Scott Lee, Crossett later formed a company called
Vurv, LLC, which was a call center. The call center would assume all sale calls for DTC
products and services. R000071. The trucking "compliance services offered by DTC
was only one of the services to be sold by the Vurv call center operation." Id.
Through 2014 and 2015, DTC was still experiencing critical cash flow issues and
was still servicing a huge amount of debt. Id. Crossett then sold DTC to Vurv, and in
exchange, Vurv agreed to payoff all DTC debts. Id.

1

This transaction closed in

December 2015 and thereafter DTC ceased to exist. Id. Vurv, LLC was later sold to
Blak, Inc. (owned by the dismissed defendants, Bo W. and Kystal Schmelling). See
R000005.
After Appellants learned of the sale of Vurv, LLC to Blak, Inc., Appellant's filed
their First Amended Complaint, adding Tessa Cousins as a paiiy plaintiff, and also added
allegations related of the sale ofVurv, LLC to Blak, Inc. R000080

1

81.

These debts exceeded $230,000. R000072.
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C.

Additional Issues presented on Appeal
Respondent has no additional issues to present in this appeal.

D.

Attorney Fees on Appeal

Crossett is entitled to an award of his attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120 (3)
because the issue that is the crux of Appellants' appeal is whether the District Court's
finding that Appellants' were not members of DTC was in error.
That is. whether the Appellants' allegation that they and Crosseti had an oral

agreement that they became members of Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC upon its
formation, was valid and enforceable. The District Court found Appellant's claim
invalid, and specifically held that Appellants did not become members of DTC upon its
formation, or at any time thereafter.
This purported oral agreement is not a transaction for personal or household purposes,
but is commercial in nature, and falls within the purview ofl.C. § 12-120 (3). That
section provides that "[i]n any civil action to recover on ... any commercial transaction
unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs." I.C. § 12-120 (3)
The statute defines "commercial transaction to mean "all transactions except transactions
for personal or household purposes." Id. "This Court has interpreted .C. § 12-120 (3) to
mandate the award of attorney fees on appeal as well as trial." Fann Credit Bank of

Spokane v. Stevensen, 125 Idaho 270,275,869 P.2d P.2d 1365, 1370 (1994).
Appellants sued Crossett for money damages related to two main claims of breach;
breach of the alleged agreement that they became members upon the formation of DTC,
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and thereafter, Crossett' s alleged breach of duty and loyalty to Appellants during his
management, operation and eventual sale to DTC to Vurv, LLC.
Thus, in the event Crossett prevails on this appeal, he should be awarded his fees and
costs incurred in having to defend it pursuant to I.C. § 12-120 (3).

E.

Argument
Appellants make no argument in this appeal warranting overturning or otherwise

remanding this case to the District Court for any further ruling. Crossett requests that a
remittitur including the taxation of costs and attorney fees be entered following a motion
for the same.
1.

The District Court did not error in its trcati.nent of statements contained in

Respondent's Answer, nor did it abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's Motion
for New Trial regarding the same.
Appellants argue that a certain "admission" contained in Respondent's Answer
filed in the underlying case should have "negated the possibility of the trial court ruling
that Defendant Crossett formed a single-member LLC." Appellant's Brief, p. 12.
Appellants appear to argue that the District Court committed error by not properly
considering the alleged admission in their case-in-chief, as well as in their motion for
new trial. Respondent will address both arguments in a single response, as the District
Comi committed no error.

a.

Applicable Law.

With regard to an error oflaw under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l)(H), a
new trial may be granted for an error in law occurring at trial. When reviewing a trial
court's ruling on a motion for new trial, this Comi applies the abuse of discretion
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standard. A trial court has wide discretion to grant or refuse a new trial, and on appeal,
"this Court will not disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of manifest
abuse." Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 179, 219 P.3d 1192, 1195 (2009).
"The test for evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion is: (1)
whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to specific choices:. and (3) whether the court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason." Id., quoting Dyet v. ~McKinley, 139 ldaho 526, 529-30, 81 P.3d
1236, 1239-40 (2003).

b.

The District Court

not error in its treatment of the subject

admission in Respondent's Answer.
Appellants in their Complaint and First Amended Complaint alleged "Defendant
[Crossett] filed, on behalf of the business that Plaintiffs and Defendant Crossett had
formed, articles of organization for an Idaho limited liability company, listing himself as
a Member or Manager and as the registered agent. The limited liability company was
named Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC." See R000027.
Crossett has never denied this allegation. There is a difference in a group of
people forming a company, and the individuals that formed the company actually
becoming members of the limited liability company, or in this case, refusing to become
members. That is, forming a company and becoming a member of a limited liability
company are two separate things, and as Appellants have been made repeatedly aware,
that has been how Crossett has consistently explained this so called "admission." Yes,
Johnson got the idea of the company (which become DTC) from his brother-in-law,
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discussed it and researched it with Crossett, they started (formed) the company, but
Johnson nor Cousins ever became a member of DTC. The District Court did not abuse
its discretion so finding.
In fact, evidence was presented throughout trial that Plaintiffs gidr1_'1Fant to
become members of DTC Group or sign the written operating agreement2 given the
turmoil that had erupted since it opened its doors for business. The Court got it exactly
right when it held that "the oral agreement with regard to Cousins and Johnson was that
they would become members upon signing of the operating agreement." R000074. This
finding was made obvious throughout the trial. "[T]he written agreement was finished by
the lawyers, and ,vas ready lo be signed by mid-July 2013 . but Johnson would not sign.
Conditions had changed. The lawsuit by DOT Group had been filed, and Johnson no
longer wanted his name associated with DTC.'' R000075. Put another way, signing of
the written operating agreement was a condition precedent to Johnson and Cousins
becoming members of DTC, and the both repeatedly refused to sign it.
Next, Appellants assert that Crossett "admitted" in the Answer that he listed
himself a member and not the member, and that this admission should have negated a
finding by the Comi that DTC Group was a single member LLC. Appellants take the
untenable position that if he really thought he was the only member then he could only

deny the allegation. Appellant's argument is frivolous.
Johnson and Crossett formed DTC Group, and orally agreed that becoming a
member in DTC was contingent upon signing a written operating agreement. Crossett
proceeded to file necessary documents with the Idaho Secretary of State so that DTC
2

The operating agreement, which was drafted by Mr. Jacobsen, had been completed and
was ready to sign within a few weeks of DTC opening for business.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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could commence operations. However, Johnson later took the position that he wanted to
"wait until the dust settled" before he signed the operating agreement. This was not a
mutual agreement, and clearly was not agreed to by Crossett. This left Crossett holding
the bag as the sole member of the LLC, and left Crossett with all the risk of carrying the
company's operations forward." R000075. "Johnson's actions were contrary to what the
two had agreed upon - that there would be a signed operating agreement." Id. Johnson
and Cousins simply backed out of the deal.
The District Court's findings in this regard are not an abuse of discretion, and
were consistent with the evidence presented at trial. There was no error. Contrary to
Appellant's argument, the District Comi did not "ignore" Crossett's admissions, it
appreciated the subject admission in the Answer for what it said and gave it the weight it
deserved, which in the context of the facts of the case, was little weight at all.
2.

The District Court did not error in its treatment of Idaho Code as it related

to limited liability companies, or its denial of the Motion for Nevv Trial regarding
the same.
Appellant's assert that the District Court committed a prejudicial error in its
treatment ofldaho Code as it relates to limited liability companies. Then Appellants'
argue they should have been given a new trial because the District Comi allegedly
ignored Idaho Code, which provides that an oral operating agreement can serve as a fully
functioning operating agreement. Because the District Court found that Johnson and
Cousins were not members of DTC, the issue of looking the Idaho Code was moot

it

didn't pertain to them.
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Crossett will again address Appellants' claim of "error", and the denial of motion
for new trial together, as there was no error committed by the District Court in either
context.
As a preliminary matter, simply because the District Court did not cite to the code
provisions contained in Appellants' pre-trial memorandum in its decision, does not mean
the District Court committed error. Again, there was no need for the District Judge to
look to the Code after it determined Johnson and Cousins were not members of DTC.
The District Court acknowledged in its decision that an operating agreement can
be an oral agreement. R000077. What Appellant's don't appreciate is that Idaho Code
doesn't help the Appellants in this case, given the District Court's findings. For example,
Appellants cite Idaho Code § 30-25-102(a)(9), which states in relevant part, "[a]s soon as
a limited liability company has any memhers, the limited liability company perforce has
an operating agreement ... " The District Court held that Crossett was the only member
of DTC upon its formation. This finding rendered Appellant's remaining claims moot.
The District Comi didn't have to look to other provisions in the Code once it
determined that Johnson and Cousins were not members.
The District Comi cited Idaho Code § 30-25-401(b), which states in relevant part
that under Idaho law "[i]f a limited liability company is to have more that one (1)
member upon formation, those persons become members as agreed by the persons before
the formation of the company." The District Comi held that "[h]ere I think the only
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence was that the agreement between Johnson
and Crossett was that Johnson, and eventually Cousins, would become members upon
signing the operating agreement." Conclusions, p. 19, R000082. That is, they were not
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members upon the formation of DTC Group, and did not agree to satisfy the condition
precedent to becoming members.
Appellants orally agreed they would become members upon signing the written
operating agreement prepared by Jacobson. Appellants refused to sign it. Which begs
the question - if they thought they ,vere actually members of DTC Group - why vmuld
they refuse to sign the written operating agreement? To follovv Appellants' line of
argument, signing the written operating agreement would simply confirm their
membership. Appellants weren't members of DTC. They didn't want to become
members, ergo, they refused to sign it Any argument otherwise is disingenuous.
To further support this point, the written operating agreemen11ha1 had been
drafted by Mr. Jacobsen provided that no person

,vm be admitted to the Company as a

member unless they sign the signature page of the operating agreement. Defendant's
Exhibit A, Section 3.4, p. 9. Signing was a condition precedent to membership.
Appellants simply choose to ignore this fact
There was no formation of the LLC with Appellants in it. " ... the only oral
agreement was an agreement to sign a written agreement." Conclusions, p. 16. "When
Johnson declined to sign the written agreement when it was ready, the formation of the
LLC fell apart." Id. That is, the formation of the LLC with Appellants as members.
The District Corni carefully aiiiculated that it fully accepted that "Crossett was
acting on behalf of both paiiies when he formed the LLC and became its sole member.
But Johnson didn't become a member upon [its] formation. Crossett's agreement with
Johnson was that he and Johnson would control the LLC when formed by means of a
written operating agreement. The written agreement was prepared, and both Johnson and

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

11

Crossett approved of its terms. All was ready to go, but Johnson would not sign."
Conclusions, p. 17, R000080.
DTC with Johnson and Cousins as members was never consummated. "Although
the plan was for common ownership between Johnson and Crossett to be as alleged, with
Cousins to be included at some stage, and although Crossett formed the company as a
single member but with the intent that both Johnson and Cousins vvould be joining him as
members as soon as the operating agreement was approved and signed, neither Cousins
nor Johnson completed the essential step in the organization of the LLC necessary for
them to become mern bers of it, that being to sign the operating agreement. .. Jolmson' s
decision not to sign the essential document necessary ... was a conscious and deliberate
decision on his part." R000082.
Contrary to Appellants argument, the District Corni did not find that an oral
operating agreement becomes null and void upon the drafting of a written operating
agreement, whether the draft is signed or not. Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The District
Court found that the oral agreement between the parties was that they would become
members of DTC upon signing the written operating agreement - that oral agreement
established the condition precedent to becoming a member of DTC.
There was no oral operating agreement3 as between Johnson and Crossett and
Cousins - Johnson and Cousins weren't members of DTC.
When both Cousins and Johnson refused to sign the written operating agreement,
it was clear they did not intend or want to be members of DTC.

3

Nor was the written operating agreement and "amendment" to the oral operating
agreement as asserted by Appellants. See Appellant's Brief, p. 18.
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Simply put, Idaho Code doesn't come into play because Appellants were not
members of DTC. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in its treatment ofldaho
Code as it is related to limited liability companies, or in denying Appellant's motion for
new trial. The Code is simply not applicable given the District Court's ruling that
Johnson and Cousins never become members of DTC.

3.

Court did not abuse its discretion in not granting Appellant's

Motion for New Trial related to liabili1)' and damages.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(1 )(G) requires a trial court to apply a tv,'o
prong test when determining whether to grant a new trial. Blizzard v. Lundeby, 156
Idaho, 204, 206 P.3cl 286 (2104)( citations omitted). The trial judge must consider
whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and then whether a different
result would follow on retrial. Id.
The District Court did not error in finding Appellants were never members of
DTC. Appellants have pointed to no fact in the record which support a claim that they
were members, other than their reliance on the "admission" in Crossett' s Answer that
they formed the business. A different result would not be reached if the case was retried.
Appellants have pointed to no fact in the record that they would have received an
monies in excess of what DTC had paid to them, had they been members of DTC "since
its inception." See Appellant's Brief, p. 21.
The District Comi found that even if it accepted (which it did not) Appellants'
theory that they were always members, or were members upon formation, that an oral
operating agreement was in place, and Idaho Code governed the relation of the parties,
the result of the case would be the same .... "DTC Group was managed by Crossett. His
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decision to outsource the sales to Vurv, and his decision to eventually transfer the assets
to Vurv were his business decisions within the scope of his authority as manager of the
LLC. Furthermore, by the time he made the decision to transfer the assets, the company
was technically insolvent. Crossett's decisions served to satisfy all of the debt remaining
in DTC and close it out debt free .. " R000080. "Under their oral agreement, there is no
dispute that Crossett was to work for the venture and have sole control over the
management of it, Johnson was not. Crossett was to receive a guaranteed distribution of
$60,000 or $65,000 per year for his direct services to the venture. The exact amount of
his guaranteed distribution does not matter because the company did not earn enough to
pay even a lesser amount. There is no obligation on Crossett's part to return or divide up
any of the compensation he took, any more than there would be any obligation on the part
of Cousins to return any part of her salary, since it did not at any time exceed the
minimum guaranteed amount." R. 000081.
The District Court clarified: "[t]his means that even if the company is deemed to
have survived with Johnson and Cousins as members, it is an empty shell, with no assets
and no liabilities, and no claim upon Crossett to account or return anything. If I accept
plaintiffs' argument, the result would be that there are no assets to distribute, and no
money due or owing from Crossett." Id.

4.

The District Court did not error in granting Respondent's Motion for

Attorney Fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3).
Appellants assert that the District Court should not have awarded Crossett
attorney fees because the gravamen of this litigation is to "enforce a statutory penalty or
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right" which is not a commercial transaction that falls ,vithin the purview ofldaho Code
§ l 2-120(3). Appellants' Brief, p. 23.

In ruling on Appellants' objection to the motion for attorney fees in the
underlying case, the District Court performed a thorough analysis of the applicable
statutes and cases, and acknowledged an action to enforce a statutory penalty or right is
not a commercial transaction for the purpose of applying Idaho Code § 12-] 20(3)
recognized under controlling case law. ROOOJ 44.
Although Appellants' contend that their cause of action against Crossett was
founded on his breach of duty under one of the applicable statutes, 4 by the time of trial,
DTC had been liquidated and dissolved. Id. The action was continued only as an
individual action for damages by the _plaintiffs against Crossett for damages. Id.
"This was not an attempted derivative action for the benefit of1he company under
I.C. § 30-25-802, but rather by individuals claiming to be members against another
member for damages on account of the individual _plaintiffs' own interests"; i.e. the
failure of Crossett to divide profits as allegedly agreed. Id.
"The action was permitted by LC.§ 30-25-801(a) so long as no part of what is
claimed inures to the benefit of the company generally, in which case it would be
permitted only as a derivative claim under LC.§ 30-22-802." Id., R000144 -145.
Notwithstanding this fact -Appellant's didn't even "get to" these statutory provisions
because the District Court found they were never members of DTC. The commercial
transaction - or the oral agreement that Appellants claim Crossett breached

was the

alleged agreement that Crossett made Appellants members of DTC upon its formation,

4

For example, LC. §§ 30-25-404(d), 30-25-407(a), 30-25-409(c), or 30-25-602.
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this was integral to Appellant's claims and was the basis on which they sought recovery. 5
The District Court held through this alleged transaction, they did not become members of
DTC, therefore the remainder of their claims became moot.
Appellants were found by the District Court to not be members of DIC. They
had no "expectancy" in the operation of DTC because they refused to sign the written
operating agreement Put another way, the first "hurdle" Appellants had to get past in !he
litigation was whether or not they were members of DTC; did the events or "transactions"
that transpired behveen the parties give Appellants membership status. This was not a
statutory claim but required a factual determination by the Court, which determination
was Appellants were not members and never became members of DTC. The remaining
claims of Appellants' thereafter become moot.
The cases relied upon by Appellants don't help their case. As held by the District
Court:
The cases cited by the plaintiff are distinguishable from the facts
found in this case. In Kelly v. [Silve,]wood Estates, 127 Idaho 624
(1995), the suit was a claimed partner against the partnership as an entity
for an accounting in connection with the winding up of partnership affairs.
It was brought under the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act and
was not an action between individuals. In Gumprect v. Doyle, 128 Idaho
242 (1995), the gravamen of the action was by a professional who had
withdrawn from the professional corporation in a dispute over the value of
shares that were repurchased by the corporation; it was brought under the
corporation code provisions pertaining to the rights of minority
shareholders, it was not an action among individuals. Shay v. Cesler, 132
Idaho 585 (1999), was an action for treble damages on unpaid wages,
which included a specific statute on attorney fees. L[&JW Supply Cmp v.
Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738 (2002) was a statutory lien
foreclosure with a specific statute covering attorney fees.

5

This commercial transaction was the basis of Appellants' claim for declaratory relief
and relief via a claim for tortious interference with business expectancy in Counts I, II,
and II of their First Amended Complaint.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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R000147.
Given the outcome of1he trial, the only conclusion can be that Crossett was the
prevailing party and was entitled to an award of his attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3).

F.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is requested that Appellants' appeal be denied in its

entirety, and that Crossett be awarded his attorney fees and costs incurred in defending
the appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 10 1h day of July, 20] 7

POINTS LAW, PLLC

Attor 1ey for Respondent David Crossett
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James F. Jacobson
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